Trusting arbitrary origins effectively disables the same-origin policy, allowing two-way interaction by third-party web sites. Unless the response consists only of unprotected public content, this policy is likely to present a security risk.
If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information. Even if it does not, attackers may be able to bypass any IP-based access controls by proxying through users' browsers.
]]>The vulnerability is affecting all versions prior 3.4.1 (between * and 3.4.1)
Other considerationsThe vulnerability might be affecting a feature of the library that the website is not using. If the vulnerable feature is not used, this alert can be considered false positive.
The library name and its version are identified based on a Retire.js signature. If the library identification is not correct, the prior vulnerability does not apply.
]]>
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Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>
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Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>Input being returned in application responses is not a vulnerability in its own right. However, it is a prerequisite for many client-side vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting, open redirection, content spoofing, and response header injection. Additionally, some server-side vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are often easier to identify and exploit when input is returned in responses. In applications where input retrieval is rare and the environment is resistant to automated testing (for example, due to a web application firewall), it might be worth subjecting instances of it to focused manual testing.
]]>The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains control over the user's computer. Further, an attacker who finds a separate application vulnerability such as cross-site scripting may be able to exploit this to retrieve a user's browser-stored credentials.
]]>Please note that modern web browsers may ignore this directive. In spite of this there is a chance that not disabling autocomplete may cause problems obtaining PCI compliance.
]]>The security impact of this issue depends largely on the nature of the application functionality. Even if it has no direct impact on its own, an attacker may use it in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to escalate their overall severity.
]]>The security impact of this issue depends largely on the nature of the application functionality. Even if it has no direct impact on its own, an attacker may use it in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to escalate their overall severity.
]]>If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially retrieve content from the application, and sometimes carry out actions within the security context of the logged in user.
Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by an attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application that allows access. CORS policies on pages containing sensitive information should be reviewed to determine whether it is appropriate for the application to trust both the intentions and security posture of any domains granted access.
]]>This behavior often arises because applications provide different user interfaces for desktop and mobile users. Mobile interfaces have often been less thoroughly tested for vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting, and often have simpler authentication and session handling mechanisms that may contain problems that are not present in the full interface.
To review the interface provided by the alternate User-Agent header, you can configure a match/replace rule in Burp Proxy to modify the User-Agent header in all requests, and then browse the application in the normal way using your normal browser.
]]>
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Performing these input transformations does not constitute a vulnerability in its own right, but might lead to problems in conjunction with other application behaviors. An attacker might be able to bypass input filters by suitably encoding their payloads, if the input is decoded after the input filters have been applied. Or an attacker might be able to interfere with other data that is concatenated onto their input, by finishing their input with the start of a multi-character encoding or escape sequence, the transformation of which will consume the start of the following data.
]]>
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Performing these input transformations does not constitute a vulnerability in its own right, but might lead to problems in conjunction with other application behaviors. An attacker might be able to bypass input filters by suitably encoding their payloads, if the input is decoded after the input filters have been applied. Or an attacker might be able to interfere with other data that is concatenated onto their input, by finishing their input with the start of a multi-character encoding or escape sequence, the transformation of which will consume the start of the following data.
]]>Performing these input transformations does not constitute a vulnerability in its own right, but might lead to problems in conjunction with other application behaviors. An attacker might be able to bypass input filters by suitably encoding their payloads, if the input is decoded after the input filters have been applied. Or an attacker might be able to interfere with other data that is concatenated onto their input, by finishing their input with the start of a multi-character encoding or escape sequence, the transformation of which will consume the start of the following data.
]]>If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behavior should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
]]>
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If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behavior should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
]]>
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If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behavior should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
]]>If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
]]>Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start writing!
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
]]>
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If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
]]>If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
]]>You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
]]>Note that some applications attempt to prevent these attacks from within the HTML page itself, using "framebusting" code. However, this type of defense is normally ineffective and can usually be circumvented by a skilled attacker.
You should determine whether any functions accessible within frameable pages can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application.
]]>Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start writing!
Note that some applications attempt to prevent these attacks from within the HTML page itself, using "framebusting" code. However, this type of defense is normally ineffective and can usually be circumvented by a skilled attacker.
You should determine whether any functions accessible within frameable pages can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application.
]]>The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.
]]>Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start writing!
It should be noted that various attacks exist against TLS in general, and in the context of HTTPS web connections in particular. It may be possible for a determined and suitably-positioned attacker to compromise TLS connections without user detection even when a valid TLS certificate is used.
]]>| Issued to: | pentesthero.io, www.pentesthero.io |
| Issued by: | Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Valid from: | Tue Feb 11 14:36:21 CET 2020 |
| Valid to: | Fri Feb 11 14:36:21 CET 2022 |
| Issued to: | Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Issued by: | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Valid from: | Tue May 03 09:00:00 CEST 2011 |
| Valid to: | Sat May 03 09:00:00 CEST 2031 |
| Issued to: | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Issued by: | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Valid from: | Tue Sep 01 02:00:00 CEST 2009 |
| Valid to: | Fri Jan 01 00:59:59 CET 2038 |
| Issued to: | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Issued by: | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
| Valid from: | Tue Sep 01 02:00:00 CEST 2009 |
| Valid to: | Fri Jan 01 00:59:59 CET 2038 |
Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start writing!
Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start writing!
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